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Recently, integrating Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) and Resource Based View (RBV) 
arguments has become one of the most prominent theoretical approaches in research on 
business relationships. We question this dominance and strengthen an exclusive TCE 
perspective by recalling two of the core TCE constructs in order to achieve full exploitation of 
TCE reasoning. We discuss the transaction attributes “asset specificity” and “uncertainty” and 
identify conceptual gaps that lead to ambiguous results regarding the test of TCE guided 
hypotheses in prior relationship marketing and management research. To overcome these 
problems, we redefine both concepts and show that they are interconnected in more complex 
ways than past empirical research has accounted for. Hypotheses are derived and tested 
empirically in a cross-sectional online-survey setting by using means of structural equation 
modelling.  
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1. Introduction 
From 1985 until today Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) reasoning has been widely successfully 
applied to research in marketing (e.g. Heide & John, 1992; Joshi & Stump, 1999; Brown, Dev, & Lee, 
2000) – especially relationship marketing – and all other areas of social sciences (for an overview see 
for example Macher & Richman, 2008). Nevertheless on second sight the picture becomes blurred as 
vote-counting (David & Han, 2004; König, 2009) or meta-analysis studies (Geyskens et al., 2006) 
show: Two of the three core TCE concepts, namely uncertainty and specificity, have been tested in 
many different but partially inconsistent or incomplete ways (David & Han, 2004; König, 2009). The 
overarching results that core TCE constructs have been neglected or ambiguously operationalized and 
potential causal relationships have not been considered in prior empirical research hint at problems 
concerning the general measurability and comparability of the constructs. As a consequence this leads 
to the problem of identifying potential interdependencies between the constructs. 
Also the question has been raised whether Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) sufficiently illuminates 
the sources of firm heterogeneity in general and the sources of different recognition and treatment of 
property rights management in particular (e.g. Foss & Foss 2004). In management and marketing 
research this question has been answered within the last years by explicitly combining TCE and 
Resource Based View (RBV) perspectives (Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007; Argyres, Bercovitz 
& Mayer, 2007) or integrating TCE within RBV perspectives in research on inter-firm relationships 
(Ghosh & John, 2005; Palmatier, Dant & Grewal, 2007). These findings however, in addition to the 
problems identified above, also raise the question whether empirical research that is primarily based 
on TCE assumptions is obsolete. In our opinion TCE has the power to generate valuable insights on its 
own. To prove this argument the contribution of our paper is twofold: 
• First we will theoretically structure the consistency and ambiguity issues of TCE construct 
operationalization by theoretically refining the concepts of specificity and uncertainty. 
• Second we will deduct hypotheses from the refined framework and statistically test them in a 
business-to-business context via an online survey setting. 
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As we will show the exploration of interdependent effects between the constructs specificity and 
uncertainty has the potential to make TCE a more powerful tool for the research on governance forms 
in general and business relationships especially.  
Accordingly the paper will continue in the following manner. Section two starts with an overview 
about the TCE framework, especially focusing on the definition of a transaction and TCE’s self-
conception as a theory of contracts. We then discuss the concept of asset specificity and show that it is 
not only the degree of specificity but also the magnitude dimension of specific investments that is 
important. The concept of uncertainty is theoretically analyzed and differentiated into different 
interdependent dimensions in the following section. It is shown that the notion of uncertainty is a 
complex phenomenon that has to be explicitly accounted for in a more sophisticated way. In the last 
section of chapter two we connect the concepts of specificity and the different kinds of uncertainty and 
deduct six hypotheses. Chapter three encompasses our empirical study in which we test the hypotheses 
empirically and interpret our results with respect to the refined theoretical framework as well as 
managerial relevance. The paper ends with a conclusion in which we also discuss limitations of our 
approach and avenues for further research. 
2. Transaction Cost Economics 
According to Williamson (1985, p. 1) a transaction “occurs when a good or service is transferred 
across a technologically separable interface”. This rather broad definition of the transaction can be 
refined by sticking closer to the basic definition of a transaction by Commons (1959, p. 4) who 
understood the transaction as the “ultimate unit of economic investigation, a unit of transfer of legal 
control.” Williamson (2005, p. 3) concludes that “…a coherent theory of organization for 
implementing these novel ideas nevertheless eluded Commons and his followers, possibly because the 
concept of transaction costs had yet to surface…”. Though Williamson also states that Commons’ later 
works “…resulted in an elaborate taxonomy, but a predictive theory of contract and organization and a 
follow-on empirical research agenda did not materialize.” (Williamson, 2005, p. 3 Fn. 5), he also 
argues for Commons’ (1931) characterization of the transaction by means of the terms “conflict,” 
“order,” and “mutuality” as a basis for his idea of governance thus agreeing on the transaction as the 
smallest unit of economic organization. In addition the explicit combination of TCE assumptions and 
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Property Rights Economics (Foss & Foss 2005) accentuates the nowadays prevailing perspective of a 
property rights based transaction definition within TCE. 
In other words it can be stated that the actors involved in transactions interact with each other in order 
to accomplish their respective goals. Their interests are not completely harmonious with each other 
and are directed at the configuration and accomplishment of action opportunities (Haase, Chatrath, & 
Saab, 2008). Commons differentiates between three kinds of transactions: “Bargaining transactions 
transfer ownership of wealth by voluntary agreements between legal equals. Managerial transactions 
create wealth by commands of legal superiors. Rationing transactions apportion the burdens and 
benefits of wealth creation by the dictation of legal superiors.” (Commons, 1934, p. 68). From a 
marketing perspective bargaining transactions predominantly take place in buyer-supplier dyads. 
Therefore a transaction always takes place in a manner where bundles of property rights over people, 
physical objects, money and/or information are somehow concentrated and/or attenuated temporarily 
during the transaction process and durable in the transaction outcome(s) (Kleinaltenkamp & Jacob, 
2002). Here fore contracts of purchase, hiring or leasing contracts, contracts of employment or 
contracts for work and labour or on service are concluded between the supplier and the customer of a 
product/service offering (Haase & Kleinaltenkamp, 2011). Accordingly we follow Haase et al. (2008) 
and define a transaction “…as a form of social interaction between economic actors (individuals as 
well as organizations) in markets (bargaining transactions) and within organizations (managerial 
transactions) that results in an exchange of property rights.“ (Haase et al. 2008, p. 11). Following this 
definition, business relationships can be defined as a series of market transactions between a customer 
and a supplier that is established not by accident (Kleinaltenkamp & Ehret, 2006) but for economic 
reasons.  
The governance mode which is chosen is directly linked to the transaction dimensions in TCE 
reasoning. If one considers pure market transactions and hierarchy as extreme poles on a governance 
mode continuum every governance mode in between can be considered a hybrid organization of 
exchange. Ménard (2004, p. 359/360) names three major problems for the governance of hybrid 
organizations in general: “…adaptation, in order to maintain the flexibility to adjust, must combine 
with control, in order to reduce discrepancies among inputs, outputs, or quality in the process itself, 
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while developing safeguards, in order to prevent opportunistic behavior that uncertainties make 
difficult to detect.”. From a contractual perspective the three types of contract law (MacNeil, 1978), 
namely classical, neoclassical and relational contracts, are applied simultaneously to at least a 
minimum extent in every transaction since the extreme poles of the continuum are somewhat ideal 
types (Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, 1987). Determinants of contractual arrangements from a TCE point of 
view thus have to be rooted within the core TCE concepts. Geyskens et al. (2006) respectively argue 
that “…in future empirical work researchers should attempt to gain insight into the underlying 
mechanisms driving governance decisions, by measuring the motivations mediating the relationships 
between transaction dimensions and governance mode chosen.” (Geyskens et al. 2006, p. 532). In 
sequence we will therefore examine the concepts of specificity and uncertainty regarding their 
denotation and connotation. 
2.1 Magnitude of a specific investment and specificity degree - Two different dimensions of asset 
specificity 
A first detailed discussion of different asset specificity dimensions and according operationalizations 
can be found in Lohtia, Brooks & Krapfel (1994). They refer to Williamson’s six forms of asset 
specificity which each have the two dimensions of specificity degree and magnitude of the investment. 
Williamson (1985, 1991) considers both dimensions but ascribes the most importance to the 
specificity degree dimension. Accordingly Lohtia et al. (1994) have found these two dimensions to 
account for most of the efforts to define and operationalize the concept of asset specificity. In their 
quantitative content analysis the specificity degree dimension was found to have been considered three 
times more often then the magnitude dimension. The six specificity forms site specificity, physical 
asset specificity, human asset specificity, dedicated asset specificity, brand name capital and temporal 
specificity are more of a connotative character whilst the magnitude and the specificity degree are 
more of a denotative character of asset specificity. 
Both, the specificity degree as well as the magnitude of the specific investment have to be considered 
explicitly and simultaneously though. The magnitude of the conducted specific investments will then 
necessarily have a different influence on the type of risk perceived by the investing party than the 
specificity degree in both cases. The latter dimension is determined by the magnitude of the quasi-rent 
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and is more of a dynamic character because amortization horizons for the respective investments are 
critical. 
Thus different specificity constellations will have different implications with regard to the kinds of 
risks perceived by either transaction party. How the magnitude dimension of specific investments 
affects uncertainty perceptions will be shown after the concept of uncertainty has been discussed in 
general terms. 
2.2 From uncertainty to different forms of uncertainty 
The concept of uncertainty has received almost as much attention in empirical TCE literature as the 
concept of specificity (Macher & Richman, 2008) but has been operationalized in more ambiguous 
ways (David & Han, 2004; Geyskens et al., 2006; König, 2009). Therefore we will start our discussion 
by going back to the original framework of Williamson (1985, 1991). 
Williamson differentiates between parametric and behavioural uncertainty. The latter one is closely 
linked to opportunistic behaviour and can be considered a strategic kind of uncertainty. The concept of 
parametric uncertainty is further differentiated into primary and secondary uncertainty following 
Koopmans (1957). Figure 1 summarizes Williamson’s uncertainty approach. 
Figure 1: Types of Uncertainty with reference to Williamson 1985 
 
While he refers to primary uncertainty as states of nature external to the firm and the market arena he 
characterizes secondary uncertainty as caused by “innocent” and “non strategic” (Williamson, 
1985, p. 59) behaviour of other market participants that among others result from a lack of 
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communication between market participants. However note that we added “own organizational 
processes” which will be important in sequence.1  
König (2009, p. 119) in her review of empirical uncertainty studies concludes an “…equal empirical 
presence of the two external uncertainty branches…” environmental change and ambiguity but detects 
an underrepresentation of the concept of behavioural uncertainty as a distinct mediator variable that is 
contingent on the interaction effect between external uncertainty and specificity.2 Therefore what 
Williamson (1985) meant originally seems partly neglected by empirical research related to this topic.  
Furthermore the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” need to be differentiated. While actors facing risk 
assign objective probabilities to future contingencies actors facing uncertainty cannot (Knight, 1921). 
Figure 2 summarizes this systematization. 
Figure 2: Conceptual definition of certainty, risk, uncertainty, and bounded rationality. Translated from 
Backhaus, Aufderheide & Späth (1994) with reference to Knight (1921) 
 
 
The concept of uncertainty can take different forms. The question is whether all possible future states 
of nature are known or not. If they are known one can speak of (narrow) uncertainty. If they are not 
known the concept of bounded rationality applies. For the latter all assessments about the quality and 
                                                 
1  We consider this modification as unproblematic because of the TCE presumption of methodological 
individualism. 
2  Also note that our understanding of ambiguity in the context of this paper is much tighter than in most 
of literature. We observe ambiguity during the process of a transaction resulting from the more or less 
complicated interaction process between buyer and supplier. Speaking in terms of figure 1, the 
ambiguity results from the interaction between a particular customer’s processes and supplier processes. 
The traditional ambiguity concept is by far more generic (for a detailed discussion see for example 
König, 2009). 
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consequentially the probabilities of future states of nature are subjective and incomplete. Only by 
chance the concept of bounded rationality and (narrow) uncertainty can be the same.  
2.3 Connecting the concepts of specificity and the different kinds of uncertainty 
Often the terms risk and uncertainty are used interchangeably. For example Ménard concludes that 
„…it is the combination of opportunism, or the risk of opportunism, and of miscoordination, or the 
risk of miscoordination, that determines the governance characterizing hybrid organizations.“ 
(Ménard, 2004, p. 360). Das & Teng (1996) similarly differentiate between relational risks and 
performance risks. The concept of relational risks “…addresses the possibility and the consequence 
that the partners in inter-firm alliances do not fully commit themselves to joint efforts.” (Das & Teng 
1996, p. 831). Performance risks on the other hand are used “…to account for the possibility and the 
consequences that the objectives of inter-firm alliances are not successfully achieved, although all 
partners co-operate fully.” (Das & Teng 1996, p.833). For Das & Teng the term performance risk 
embraces all kinds of hazards, except those related to co-operation. An important modification 
regarding this assumption has to be made if one considers the transaction as a more or less complex 
transfer of property rights with according customer integration. This modification combines 
Williamson’s differentiation between behavioral, primary parametric and secondary parametric 
uncertainty as depicted in figure 2 with the concepts of relational and performance risk. This means 
that behavioral uncertainty can be regarded synonymous to the concept of relational risks while 
secondary parametric uncertainty can be regarded equivalent to performance risks. Also the quality 
dimension differs around the two risk types. While relational risks are more of a risk, thus imperfect 
but complete knowledge character, performance risks, though potentially influenceable by coordinated 
actions, are more of incomplete knowledge or even bounded rationality character. The different 
complexity levels concerning the arrangement of temporary property rights in the transaction process 
are thus unique determinants of different risk types. They lead to different perceived risk types which 
in turn may lead to different contractual regimes installed by the parties to reduce the risks 
accordingly. A procedural understanding will be necessary to connect both lines of thought. Specific 
investments are only conducted if the net value (acquired value minus acquisition costs, transaction 
costs and production costs) is the biggest among all other alternatives. Therefore the long-term 
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strategic calculus determines the – in marketing terms – “evoked set of alternatives” in a broad sense 
while the mid-range strategic calculus consists of an assessment of these alternatives and their 
suitability for the respective situation. 
The combination of asset specificity and uncertainty thus leads to two general propositions regarding 
the magnitude and the degree of specificity. First, it seems obvious that the magnitude of specific 
investments implies that at least imperfect knowledge is existent with regards to the success of a 
transaction. Because of the complexity degree that is inherent in every market transaction this 
argument holds even under the absence of possible behavioral uncertainties. Thus performance risks 
are more likely to be of at least narrow uncertainty or even bounded rationality character if the 
transaction is complex. This leads to hypothesis H1: 
H1 The higher the magnitude of partner specific investments by the supplier the higher are the 
performance risks perceived by both parties. 
Second, the degree of behavioral risks is influenced by different specificity degree 
constellations. The notion of bounded rationality in that case is not critical because potential 
opportunistic behavior by either party is common knowledge in a game theoretic sense. Thus it seems 
more likely that relational risks are ceteris paribus more of a risk or at most narrow uncertainty 
character. Nevertheless relational risks will be perceived in every transaction and we can deduct H2 as 
follows: 
H2 The higher the magnitude of partner specific investments conducted the higher are the 
relational risks perceived by the investing party. 
Perceived relational risks result from different degrees of asset specificity and/or different 
amortization horizons for the respective relevant parties’ investments. The risk or narrow uncertainty 
character of relational risks demands for a written form anticipation of as many as possible 
contingencies potentially leading to opportunistic behavior. Also all possible opportunistic actions by 
the contracting parties have to be anticipated as well. This also implies that external uncertainty, 
understood as primary parametric uncertainty in Williamson’s terms, and performance risks are 
antecedents of relational risks in general. The rationale behind this argument is simply probabilistic 
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because more possible contingencies lead to smaller probabilities even under complete imperfect 
knowledge conditions. This leads to hypotheses H3 and H4: 
H3 Performance risks drive perceived relational risks. 
H4 Environmental uncertainty drives perceived relational risks. 
Whereas the preceding hypotheses regarded relational risks as a variable that is dependent on two 
variables (magnitude of specific investments and environmental uncertainty) we only identified one 
independent variable (magnitude of specific Investment) for performance risks so far. While the 
argument for H4 is theoretically deducted we also want to control for the influence of environmental 
uncertainty on perceived performance risks. Thus hypothesis H5 is formulated as follows: 
H5 Environmental uncertainty  increases perceived performance risks. 
Considering that specific investments are conducted to transact or prepare to transact resources that are 
critical for the company’s success one can also conclude that specific investments also have a risk 
reducing component per se. This means that specific investments are also conducted in order to reduce 
the influence of parametric primary uncertainties on parametric secondary uncertainties as for example 
performance risks. This leads to hypothesis H6: 
H6 The interaction between the magnitude of specific investments and environmental uncertainty 
lowers perceived performance risks. 
3. Empirical study 
To test these hypotheses we apply a structural equation modeling approach to cross sectional survey 
data using an online survey which addressed managers engaged in business-to-business 
marketing/sales. We personally contacted 4500 Sales Managers via an online business network and 
retrieved 642 usable questionnaires. This equals a response rate of 14.3%, which we consider quite 
good.3 To assure randomization of the researched business relationship we asked managers to answer 
the questions exclusively in connection with the last deal closed before participating in the survey. 
                                                 
3  In the Online Business Network only 50 Managers per day can be contacted. For a three month period 
we contacted 50 Managers per day. We were thus only able to contact each manager once within this 
period. Therefore a control of non response bias was not possible. 
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They were reminded on each page of the online survey to answer all questions only in relation with 
that particular deal.  
3.1 Construct measurement 
Concerning the independent variable magnitude of specific investments we adapted scales used by 
Cannon et al. (2000) and Rokkan, Heide & Wathne (2003) to our research context.4 We defined the 
concept of relational risks as the perceived risk that the other party may behave opportunistic. Again 
we adapted the opportunism scales used by Rokkan et al. (2003) to our context. For the concept of 
performance risk – from our theoretical perspective – the operationalization was a little more 
complicated. We do not challenge the fact that there are many already well established scales 
concerning constructs as task interdependence (Gulati, Lawrence & Puranam, 2005) or performance 
ambiguity (for an overview see for example David & Han, 2004).  
However, coming from a business-to-business and a service marketing perspective we needed to take 
a more intangible transaction process perspective to account for the property rights based definition of 
a transaction. The Service Dominant Logic’s (Vargo & Lusch, 2004) success as an innovative 
perspective on markets and society also accentuates this process aspect of value creation in general. 
We found a promising operationalization in the “gap model” of service quality by Zeithaml, 
Berry & Parasuraman (1988). This quite complex scale had to be simplified and adapted to our 
questionnaire. We used single indicators for the perceived risk by the supplier that gaps 1 and/or 2 
might become critical. Additionally we included one new item asking if the supplier perceived the 
risk, that the customer would communicate different expectations than he really had. We asked the 
same three questions regarding the perceived risk by the customer in the respondent’s estimation. 
Environmental uncertainty was measured as a higher order formative construct. We operationalized 
environmental uncertainty in the context of the environmental dynamism construct by Achrol & Stern 
(1988, p. 37) who define their construct as “…the perceived frequency of change and turnover in 
marketing forces”. They differentiate between the sub-dimensions dynamism own marketing practices, 
dynamism in competitor’s marketing practices and customer dynamism. We consequently adapted 
their scales to our general business-to-business research context and, considering the index based 
                                                 
4  Please see the appendix for the detailed information on the scales and items used. 
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operationalization by Achrol & Stern (1988), operationalized them as the formative first order 
constructs environmental uncertainty supplier, environmental uncertainty competitors and 
environmental uncertainty customers. Together they make up the overall degree of environmental 
uncertainty which was additionally measured with a single indicator.  
Using the studies of Rakkona et al. (2003) and Cannon et al. (2000) as a reference, control variables 
accounted for in this study were the concept of relational norms, size of the customer in comparison to 
the supplier and the magnitude of the investment conducted by the customer in the opinion of the 
supplier. For the concept of relational norms four items were taken from Cannon et al. (2000) because 
of their reliability as well as their manageable number. The relative size was measured with a single 
item. Specific investments by the customer were measured analogous to the measure for magnitude of 
specific investments by the supplier. 
When it comes to analyzing relations between constructs (latent variables), Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) represents a standard method in marketing and management research (see 
for example Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 2000 or Henseler, Ringle & Sinkowics, 2009). The two 
matching statistical techniques for estimating such models are the covariance-based structural equation 
modeling and partial least squares (PLS) path modeling approach. Whereas covariance-based 
structural equation modeling has long been the predominant approach for analyzing latent variable 
models, PLS path modeling has recently gained increasing recognition, especially in the field of 
marketing research. In general the prediction oriented PLS path modeling and covariance-based SEM, 
which has its focus on confirmatory modeling need to be seen as complementary approaches. A soft-
modeling approach like PLS path modeling does not rest on any distributional assumptions. Due to the 
fact that the underlying algorithm estimates OLS regressions for parts (blocks) of the model 
separately, the complexity of the model does not strongly influence sample size requirements 
(Henseler et al., 2009). Therefore the approach can be applied to estimate relationships between 
constructs when sample size is rather small and/or when formative constructs cause potential 
identification problems in covariance based SEM. (Chin & Newsted, 1999, Tennenhaus et al. 2005). 
For a more detailed comparison of the two modeling approaches please see for example Schneeweiß 
(1991) or Tenenhaus et al. (2005). The more predictive and exploratory nature of the approach and the 
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fact that we have three formative constructs in our model, led to the decision to use PLS path 
modeling in our empirical study. Our analysis is conducted with the software solution SmartPLS, 
Version 2.0b (Ringle, Wende & Will 2005).  
The structural equation modeling (SEM) was undertaken in two stages (Anderson & Gerbing 1988) 
starting with the evaluation of the measurement model estimating the structural model. Based on the 
conceptual underpinnings presented above, all constructs except the sub-dimensions of the 
environmental uncertainty construct are modeled with reflective scales. The interaction effect of asset 
specificity and environmental uncertainty (global) is incorporated by a multiple product indicator 
approach (Chin et al. 2003). All constructs were assessed in terms of internal and external consistency 
(Anderson et al. 1987; Gerbing and Anderson 1988).  
Reflective Scales: All standardized factor loadings were significant and higher than the required 
minimum level of 0.708, 0.716 being the lowest loading. Thus no refinements on the measurement 
models were needed. Respectively the average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct exceeded 
the desirable level of 0.50 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Furthermore, the composite reliability of each 
construct exceeded the 0.70 level (Nunnally 1978), the lowest value being 0.86 for the relational 
norms construct. As the distributional properties of estimates are not known in the partial least squares 
approach, the assessment of significance needs to be carried out with the help of resampling methods. 
We used a bootstrap procedure with 1000 re-samples.  
Table 1: Construct Reliability measures for reflective operationalizations 
 AVE Composite Reliability R Square 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
environmental uncertainty 1.000 1.000 0.529 1.000 
environmental uncertainty * specific 
investments supplier 0.745 0.921 0.000 0.905 
performance risk 0.615 0.905 0.136 0.875 
relational norms 0.599 0.856 0.000 0.777 
relational risk supplier 0.718 0.927 0.396 0.902 
specific investments customer 0.812 0.945 0.000 0.922 
specific investments supplier 0.763 0.928 0.000 0.897 
 
We assessed common method bias using Harman’s single-factor analysis. A varimax rotated factor 
analysis extracted five factors for the multiple item constructs that had an initial eigenvalue above 1 
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that accounted for 65.3% of the explained variance, the first factor accounting for 26% of the variance. 
The fact that no single factor accounted for more than 50% of the variance in the data gives an 
indication that common method bias is not critical (Podsakoff & Organ 1986). We were also able to 
assure convergent validity with the factor analysis since assessing the cross loadings did not show any 
item that loaded higher on a different than the intended to measure construct. Discriminant validity 
between the constructs was assessed using the criterion of Fornell and Larcker (1981) by comparing 
the respective construct’s square root of the AVE to its correlations with every other construct. We 
could assure sufficient differences between the constructs. 
Formative Constructs: To assess the formative higher order construct we evaluated each sub-
dimension in terms of potential multicollinearity and therefore calculated the Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) for each sub-dimension with multiple linear regressions. The highest value for VIF was 
2.14. Thus we can assume that multcollinearity is not an issue on the first order construct level. Also 
all factor weights except one for item 4 for the external uncertainty competitor dimension were 
significant on a five percent level.  
With an R2 of 0.53 we can assume a sufficient influence of the sub-dimensions on the second order 
construct. Also the sub-dimensions environmental uncertainty supplier (0.58) and environmental 
uncertainty customers (0.11) have path coefficients that are significant on a 0.01 level. Only the path 
coefficient for environmental uncertainty competitors (0.08) is marginally significant on a 0.1 level for 
a two-tailed test. For theoretical reasons it is nevertheless retained in the analysis. 
3.2 Results of the structural model 
Table 2 shows the results of the structural (inner) model. In the second column the path coefficients of 
the proposed relationships (first column) are documented. As already stated, the assessment of 
significance is generated with a bootstrap approach. The relevant sample means and calculated 
standard errors are given in columns three and four. The last column of the table contains information 
on the effect sizes calculated for significant relationships. According to the literature, values below 
0.15 are to be seen as weak, whereas values above 0.35 are strong effect sizes and in between one can 
assume a moderate effect on the dependent variable (Chin 1998). As one can see, although most of the 
hypothesized path coefficients are significant an a .01 α-level, the effect sizes vary a lot and are quite 
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small in many instances. The predictive relevance of the model can be evaluated with the Stone-
Geisser criterion (Q²). According to Fornell & Cha (1994) predictive relevance is given for Q²>0. We 
hypothesized relational risks perceived by the supplier and performance risks as dependent variables. 
Values for Q2 were 0.08 for performance risk and 0.27 for relational risk. We thus can assume 
sufficient predictive relevance. 
Table 2: Path coefficients, Standard Error and Effect Size Report 
Relationships Coefficient Sample Mean 
Standard 
Error Effect Size
Specific investments supplier → performance risk  0.247 0.244 0.045 0.06 
Specific investments supplier → relational risk supplier 0.251 0.249 0.040 0.08 
Performance risk → relational risk supplier 0.225 0.225 0.034 0.08 
Environmental uncertainty → relational risk supplier 0.055 0.056 0.029 0,01 
Environmental uncertainty → performance risk 0.108 0.109 0.040 0.01 
Environmental uncertainty * specific investments 
supplier → performance risk 0.050 0.070 0.037  
Relational norms → performance risk -0.175 -0.179 0.040 0.03 
Relational norms → relational risk supplier -0.447 -0.449 0.033 0.27 
Size_supplier_versus_customer → performance risk 0.011 0.033 0.025  
Size_supplier_versus_customer → relational risk 
supplier 0.029 0.035 0.025  
Specific investments customer → performance risk  0.104 0.105 0.045 0.01 
Specific investments customer → relational risk 
supplier -0.026 -0.031 0.023  
 
Performance risks are mainly driven by the magnitude of specific investments. Like assumed in 
hypothesis 1, the more specific investments are made, the more performance risks are perceived.5 
Specific investments significantly increase perceived relational risks for the investing party, 
supporting hypothesis 2.  
Also hypothesis 3 is supported. As proposed in hypothesis 5, environmental uncertainty has an effect 
on performance risk on its own. But opposed to hypothesis 6 no significant interaction effect with the 
magnitude of specific investments can be observed. Environmental uncertainty only has .05 α-level 
                                                 
5  Due to the fact that we interviewed sales managers we could only ask for the perceived risk by the 
customer in estimation of the supplier. Nevertheless the factor reliability scores show satisfactory 
results. 
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significant effect on relational risk and therefore only exerts a marginal influence. Thus hypothesis 4 
is only partly supported. 
Concerning the control variables relational risk is strongly affected by relational norms. In a way that 
the more relational norms are involved, the smaller is the relational risk perceived by the supplier. In 
contrast to that the difference in company size did not exert a significant influence on the dependent 
variables. The magnitude of the specific investments conducted by the customer also had no significant 
effect on relational risk and a marginal effect on performance risk. 
The following table summarizes the results regarding our hypotheses. 
Table 3: Summary of hypotheses 
Hypotheses 
H1 
The higher the magnitude of partner specific investments conducted by the supplier the higher 
are the perceived performance risks  D 
H2 
The higher the magnitude of partner specific investments conducted by the supplier the higher 
are the relational risks perceived by the supplier. D 
H3 Performance risks drive perceived relational risks. D 
H4 Environmental uncertainty drives perceived relational risks. (D) 
H5 Environmental uncertainty increases perceived performance risks. D 
H6 
The interaction between the magnitude of specific investments and degree of environmental 
uncertainty lowers perceived performance risks. x 
 
3.3 Review of empirical findings 
We were able to confirm five out of the six hypotheses we have deducted. Although the effect sizes 
have to be regarded as small, we were able to account for an R2 of .396 for the relational risk construct 
and an R2 of .136 for our newly developed performance risk construct. According to Chin (1998) this 
can be regarded as satisfactory for the former and small for the latter. 
Due to the fact that the scale for performance risk was adopted and significantly reduced from a 
Service Marketing setting to our TCE based research context we nevertheless consider our results as 
satisfactory in general. We were able to confirm interdependencies between different uncertainty 
concepts in a large cross sectional setting. We find support for our framework of discriminant yet 
interdependent TCE dimensions magnitude of specific investments, relational risk and performance 
risk. Especially the interdependence between performance risk and relational risk can be proven from 
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a purely TCE based perspective. Therefore it can be concluded that research that is based exclusively 
on TCE reasoning is not obsolete and can still yield valuable insights concerning interfirm 
cooperation. 
The managerial relevance is to be seen primarily in the analytic differentiation between performance 
risk and relational risk. Relational risks have to be accounted for and reduced by means of contractual 
safeguards and the creation of relational norms in terms of establishing a trustful business relationship. 
Performance risks, on the other hand, have to be reduced by successfully establishing transaction 
process coordination mechanisms. The former is connected to the dyad: The latter has to be designed 
by each party itself but has to be constantly improved and adopted to the ongoing or future 
transaction(s) by permanently considering lessons learned from past transactions.  
Transferred to the area of relationship marketing the according tools may also vary according to the 
risk type. Relational risks can be easier anticipated, the concept of performance risks, in contrast, has 
to be seen more complex because of the existing interdependencies between the knowledge base of the 
transaction parties. Thus only joint efforts by both parties have a risk reducing impact especially the 
reduction of performance risks seems to be the real challenge for relationship marketers. 
4. Conclusion 
The combination of the arguments above resulted in a refinement of TCE thinking concerning the 
transaction itself as well as in a better understanding of interdependencies between uncertainty and 
specificity on a theoretical level. We precised the TCE based grasp of vertical business-to-business 
relationships by explicitly accounting for different perceived risks and their supposed respective 
determinants in terms of specific investment dimensions. By this explicit inclusion of different forms 
of uncertainty and risks we replied to Ménards (2004, p. 368/369) request for incorporating 
uncertainty in a more sophisticated manner since “…it is clearly a distinct variable that would deserve 
to be explored in more detail and introduced more explicitly in order to better understand which form 
of hybrid organization is chosen.” 
From a theoretical perspective the explicit consideration of property rights theory in combination with 
transactions and business relationships as defined in this paper helps to further overcome the gap 
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between the efficiency and the effectiveness dichotomy that evidently lead to the combination of TCE 
and RBV approaches within the least years. Because it seems possible to describe the distribution of 
property rights in the transaction process as well as in the transaction outcome (Kleinaltenkamp & 
Jacob 2002), an abstraction from product, firm and other categories becomes possible. Relationships 
similar to hierarchic governance are connected to high transaction costs, severe uncertainties and 
incomplete contracts while dyads closer to pure market arrangements are linked to low transaction 
costs, minimal risks and standardized complete often implicit contracts. The accumulation of critical 
resources will mostly be connected with the former. Further research on transactions and relationships 
in business-to-business marketing will thus hopefully help to integrate efficiency (transaction cost 
optimizing calculus) and effectiveness (accumulation of capabilities and strategic resources). 
Additionally the plural form thesis (e.g. Cannon, Achrol, & Grundlach, 2000; Bradach, 1997)6 as well 
as the findings of the Contemporary Marketing Practices Group suggest that “…within a 
customer/product type, firms choose to compete in different ways.” (Coviello, Brodie, Danaher, & 
Johnston 2002, p. 42) and succeed independently of the governance type in place still need further 
explanation. To further investigate these issues dynamic theoretical approaches have to be used in 
combination with the refined governance branch of TCE in future empirical research as well. Research 
on property rights attenuation versus concentration possibly in combination with path dependence 
theory and market process theory within different business-to-business marketing regimes might be 
applicable here (Haase & Kleinaltenkamp 2011). 
With regards to operationalization and empirical issues our approach can be understood as a 
starting point. We were able to confirm most of our deducted hypotheses. Nevertheless the relative 
low effect sizes and the rejection of two of our proposed hypotheses leave certain questions 
unanswered and raise new ones. E.g. the question remains whether the relationships between the 
constructs are linear. Also other potential antecedents for the distinct risk types will have to be 
identified in future research. For example the dynamic nature of the quasi rent concept seems to be one 
potential antecedent of the relational risk concept that needs further exploration. Furthermore more 
                                                 
6  Note that the term “plural forms” is understood in different ways within the extant literature (Heide 
2003, Fn. 1). We follow Cannon et al. (2000) who apply the term to an inter-organizational relationship 
perspective.  
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sophisticated and complete uncertainty scales will have to be applied to the different uncertainty 
dimensions.  
The connection to governance outcomes is necessary to test whether the distinct risk concepts play a 
mediating role between governance forms and transaction dimensions. Last but not least we were only 
able to use monadic data. Though we tried to account for common method variance dyadic data, 
especially in the area of research in relationship marketing, seem to be more promising. A future 
research agenda thus may contain different and, more importantly, interdisciplinary research areas, 
empirically as well as theoretically.  
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Appendix: 

















Magnitude of specific investment by supplier: reflective 
(strongly disagree – strongly agree) 
 
• All in all we have invested quite a bit specifically for the last closed deal with this particular 
customer. 
• All in all we have conducted quite a few adjustments specifically for that last closed deal with 
this particular customer.  
• We have undertaken significant investments specifically for that last closed deal with this 
particular customer.  
• The specific investment in terms of time and money was quite high for the last deal with this 
customer. 
 
Magnitude of specific investment by supplier: formative 
(not at all – to a high degree) 
• Specifically for the last deal with this customer assigned certain personnel. 
• Specifically for the last deal with this customer we expanded our production and/or inventory. 
• Specifically for the last deal with this customer we have invested in capital assets. 
• Specifically for the last deal with this customer we have invested in specific Know-How (e.g. 
certain trainings) in terms of time and money. 
• Specifically for the last deal with this customer we have conducted significant site specific 
investments like location decisions or –investments. 
 
Magnitude of specific investment by customer: reflective 
(strongly disagree – strongly agree) 
 
• All in all the customer has invested quite a bit specifically for the last closed deal with us. 
• All in all the customer conducted quite a few adjustments specifically for that last closed deal 
with us. 
• The customer has undertaken significant investments specifically for that last closed deal with us. 
• The specific investment by the customer  in terms of time and money was quite high for the last 
deal with us. 
 
Magnitude of specific investment by supplier: formative 
(not at all – to a high degree) 
 
• Specifically for the last deal with us the customer assigned certain personnel. 
• Specifically for the last deal with us this customer expanded its production and/or inventory. 
• Specifically for the last deal with us the customer has invested in capital assets. 
• Specifically for the last deal with us the customer has invested in specific Know-How (e.g. 
certain trainings) in terms of time and money. 
• Specifically for the last deal with us this customer has conducted significant site specific 
investments like location decisions or –investments. 
 
Amortization horizon (variable for grouping purposes only) 
(yes – no) 
 
• Has the sum of the specific investments amortized within the course of the last transaction with 
this customer? 
• Will the sum of the specific investments be amortized after the transaction with this customer has 
been successfully finished? 
 
• Has the sum of the specific investments conducted by the customer amortized for him within the 
course of the last transaction with you? 
• Will the sum of the specific investments by the customer be amortized for the customer after the 




(very few – quite many) 
 
• How many transactions will probably be needed to amortize the specific investments for your 
company? 
• How many transactions will probably be needed to amortize the specific investments for your 
customer? 
New items 
Relational risk (very low – very high) 
We consider            
 
• the risk that one party does not always act in accordance with the contract(s) as… 
• the risk that one party promises things without actually doing them later as… 
• the risk that one party will try to take advantage of “holes” in contracts to further their own 
interests as… 
• the risk that one party will lie about certain things as… 











Performance risk (very low – very high): (3 items each party) 
We consider/the customer considers 
 
• the risk that we do not perceive the customer’s expectations in the right way because of the 
complexity of the transaction as… 
• the risk that we do not specify the perceived customer expectations in the right way because of 
the complexity of the transaction as… 
• the risk that the customer will communicate another expected product than he really needs as… 
 
Relational norms (very inaccurate description – very accurate description) 
 
• Both sides are willing to make cooperative changes. 
• One party will not take advantage of a strong bargaining position. 
• We do not mind owing each other favours. 




External uncertainty global (monthly – more seldom than every 4 years): reflective single indicator 
 
• How often are changes in the marketing strategy of your business unit necessary? 
 
External uncertainty (monthly – more seldom than every 4 years): formative 












External uncertainty competitor (monthly – more seldom than every 4 years): formative 






External uncertainty customers (monthly – more seldom than every 4 years): formative 
• How often do your customer’s preferences change concerning the following issues? 
- product 
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